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A Fledgling Presidency 
With the publication of far-reach-
ing executive orders, President 
Donald J. Trump is making good 
on the promises he delivered on 
the U.S. presidential campaign 
trail. From mandating reform on 
immigration and border securi-
ty to walking back international 
trade and commercial agree-
ments, the Trump presidency 
has drawn both ire and confusion 
from its counterparts south of the 
Rio Grande. The first 100 days 
of the Trump presidency have 
now elapsed, and much of Latin 
American society finds itself em-
boldened to take on the discor-
dant rhetoric emanating from the 
White House. Many worry that a 
Trump presidency will usher in a 
cooling of North-South relations, 
or that the economies of Latin 
American countries will suffer 
from less favorable trade deals or 
taxation of remittances. However, 
the variable in this equation is the 
amount of attention given to Latin 
America by Trump. Will a Trump 
White House really promulgate 
all of their promised policies? Or 
rather, will they choose to pursue 
a policy of (benign or malign) in-
difference? As Michael Reid says 
upon analyzing Obama’s relation-
ship with Latin America: 
For U.S. presidents, Latin America 
usually offers more frustrations 
than foreign policy triumphs. The 
region’s leaders gripe about both 
U.S. interference and U.S. ne-
glect. Because it is not a source 
of strategic threats, Latin America 
languishes at the bottom of the 
United States’ long list of foreign 
policy priorities (Reid 2015: 46).
What exactly the Trump presi-
dency will mean for relations 
between the U.S.A. and Latin 
American countries (LACs) is still 
to be seen. Rather than jumping 
directly into rash prognostica-
tions and divinations without any 
context or base knowledge, this 
analysis would first benefit from 
an investigation into the things 
that are known: Obama’s ac-
complishments and failures and 
the rhetoric that Trump vocalized 
during the presidential campaign. 
In doing so, one can distinguish 
points of departure between what 
has already been said and done 
and what might be enacted under 
Trump. 
Out of his eight years as presi-
dent, Barack Obama’s most well-
known Latin American foreign 
policy accomplishment would 
certainly be the re-establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Cuba. 
Two additional bilateral trade 
agreements with Colombia and 
Panama were also signed into 
force, and the Obama adminis-
tration claimed some credit fol-
lowing the historic signing of the 
Colombian Peace Agreements, 
to which Obama had an envoy 
sent. President Obama also criti-
cized the Maduro administration 
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in Venezuela for its undemocratic 
practices, even going through the 
motions of castigating the regime 
by means of international insti-
tutions, i.e. the Organization of 
American States (OAS). All in all, 
it can be safely said that Obama’s 
tenure did not mark a substantial 
departure from the neoliberal/
liberal internationalist policies of 
past presidencies. The bungling 
of the 2009 Honduran coup and 
subsequent provisional elections 
seemed like just another blip in 
a long line of dubious regime 
changes supported, whether im-
plicitly or explicitly, by the U.S.A. 
(Reid 2015: 49). Not all of these 
aforementioned “successes” can 
be unanimously claimed as wins, 
however. What Obama heralded 
as an accomplishment, the Cuban 
opening, many viewed as a con-
cessional sign of weakness and 
a betrayal of democratic values. 
More so, many have criticized 
Obama’s failure to definitively 
act in regard to the Venezuelan 
quagmire. Obama’s hands-off de-
meanor has also allowed China 
to cement their foothold in Latin 
American economies, which has 
subsequently resulted in an over-
all loss of U.S. influence on the 
continent (Reid 2015: 47-48). 
Furthermore, Obama oversaw the 
removal of some 3,094,208 im-
migrants during his tenure, more 
than the Clinton and Bush ad-
ministration combined (Chishti/
Pierce/Bolter 2017).1 While this 
1 As Migration Policy says, the Obama 
administration also focused, “less on 
increasing absolute numbers of over-
all deportations and [put] a higher 
priority on targeting the removals 
of recently-arrived unauthorized im-
migrants and criminals. The admin-
istration also placed a much lower 
priority on removing those who had 
established roots in U.S. communities 
figure should be presented in the 
proper context – Bush and Clin-
ton had incredibly higher rates 
for border apprehensions and 
returns – it has not stopped the 
designation of Obama as “De-
porter-in-Chief”. Despite allocat-
ing funds for programs like Plan 
Colombia and the Mérida Plan, 
Obama also failed to recalibrate 
the failing “War on Drugs”. While 
it could be argued that the Obama 
administration should be held ac-
countable for major failings in re-
gard to its Latin American foreign 
policy, the one thing that Presi-
dent Obama can be conclusively 
credited with is his refusal to en-
gage in the racially charged and 
xenophobic rhetoric disseminated 
by Trump. This rhetoric, designed 
to provoke and dehumanize those 
residents who are in the U.S.A. 
without proper documentation 
or who possess Hispanic and/or 
Latino heritages, is undoubtedly 
one key difference between the 
two presidents (Aguilar Valenzu-
ela 2017). 
Throughout his campaign, and 
even into the first three months 
of his presidency, Trump has not 
been afraid to express the “po-
litically incorrect”. At a rally on 
June 16, 2015, Trump said “When 
Mexico sends its people, they’re 
not sending their best […] they’re 
bringing drugs. They’re bring-
ing crime. They’re rapists. And 
some, I assume, are good peo-
ple” (Edelman 2016). A Tweet he 
sent in 2015 criticized Jeb Bush’s 
outreach to the Latino-American 
community: “So true. Jeb Bush is 
crazy, who cares that he speaks 
Mexican, this is America, Eng-
and had no criminal records” (Chishti/
Pierce/Bolter 2017). 
While it could be 
argued that the 
Obama admin-
istration should 
be held account-
able for major 
failings in re-
gard to its Latin 
American foreign 
policy, the one 
thing that Presi-
dent Obama can 
be conclusively 
credited with 
is his refusal to 
engage in the 
racially charged 
and xenophobic 
rhetoric dissemi-
nated by Trump.
Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 5
lish!!”. It goes without saying that 
Bush’s Spanish is misclassified, 
almost purposefully, as Mexican. 
A third example can be seen in 
his ad hominem attacks made 
against U.S. District Judge Gonza-
lo Curiel (Edelman 2016). Trump 
said that there was no way Curiel 
could remain unbiased in his hear-
ing of the Trump University fraud 
case due to the fact that he, as 
a “Mexican”, would be inherently 
against the wall Trump promised 
to build and would therefore be 
tempted to take his anger out on 
Trump via the courtroom (Edel-
man 2016). Irrelevant to Trump, 
apparently, was the fact that Cu-
riel is a U.S. citizen, born in Indi-
ana. While in office, he has stated 
his support for controversial and 
arguably inhumane plans, includ-
ing the splitting up of Central 
American families detained af-
ter illegally crossing the border 
as an attempt to deter migra-
tion and the creation of an office 
that publicizes crimes committed 
by unauthorized immigrants: the 
latter being “a reflection of the 
old strain of American intolerance 
that brought us [the U.S.A.] in-
ternment camps and miscegena-
tion laws” (The New York Times 
Editorial Board 2017). This short 
snippet of background informa-
tion presented in the past para-
graph has hopefully placed the 
comments and actions of the past 
two presidents in a comparative 
context. It should be noted that 
U.S. foreign policy on Latin Amer-
ica will not magically transform 
overnight, changing from good to 
evil. What is much more likely to 
take place are deviations to pre-
existing policy: policies like the 
“War on Drugs” and immigration 
restrictions, that latter of which 
claims a provenance that stretch-
es back decades and includes 
multiple presidential administra-
tions of both parties as support-
ers. Latin America can expect a 
more stringent retrenchment on 
these policies, along with a presi-
dential rhetoric more forthcoming 
in its nationalistic and xenophobic 
tones. What now must be done is 
determine how rhetoric will trans-
form into action and how ideas 
will become policy. 
The lack of coherent policy or 
power hierarchies at the execu-
tive level combined with a revolv-
ing door of advisors mean that the 
actions taken by the Trump White 
House are difficult to predict at a 
structural level. Despite such un-
certainty, however, Latin America 
has an alternative to the “wait-
and-see” approach. Currently in 
the midst of a decade marked by 
enhanced regional coordination 
and economic cooperation, Latin 
American countries find them-
selves in a unique position to take 
on a possibly hostile White House. 
The existence of new opportuni-
ties is not something restricted 
to Latin America, however; the 
Trump presidency also finds it-
self in a position to enliven the 
relatively stagnant policy stances 
taken by past presidents of all 
stripes – should it feel obliged 
to do so. Realistically, the Trump 
presidency seems to portend the 
return of semi-isolationism and 
protectionism to U.S. foreign pol-
icy, but should the U.S.A. decide 
to abdicate its role of global arbi-
ter, the subsequent power vacu-
um will surely not favor its global 
security and economic interests.
The lack of co-
herent policy 
or power hier-
archies at the 
executive level 
combined with 
a revolving door 
of advisors mean 
that the actions 
taken by the 
Trump White 
House are dif-
ficult to predict 
at a structural 
level. Despite 
such uncertainty, 
however, Latin 
America has an 
alternative to the 
“wait-and-see” 
approach.
Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 20176
Trump’s Role in Latin 
American Politics
The question that this piece hopes 
to expound upon can be boiled 
down to the following: What does 
a Trump Presidency mean for 
Latin America, and what are the 
policy options available to Latin 
America in terms of mitigating a 
Trump presidency? Latin America 
is anything but a homogenous 
entity: that is clear. Recognizing 
the plurality and heterogeneity of 
Latin America, this piece hopes 
to stress the positive externali-
ties that enhanced sociopolitical 
and economic cooperation can 
provide for the region. Moving 
further afield than protracting 
failed neo-liberal economic re-
forms, meaningful coordination 
could prove to be beneficial for 
a continent trying to balance its 
own oscillations between popu-
lisms from the left and right. With 
the creation of the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) in 
2008, the Pacific Alliance (PA) in 
2011, and the Community of Lat-
in American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) in 2011, Latin America 
has begun a promising, if not at 
least symbolic, process of deep-
ening interdependency. While this 
interconnectedness cannot possi-
bly neutralize a trade dependence 
on the U.S.A. that many South 
and Central American countries 
claim – a dependency that will 
certainly temper potential efforts 
of regionalization – Latin America 
can nonetheless seek out possi-
ble ameliorations. That is to say, 
while Mexico cannot incite a trade 
war with the U.S.A., Mexico’s #1 
import and export market, it can 
certainly look to expand its com-
mercial reach southward and 
amplify its cross-Pacific relation-
ships.
Since the turn of the decade, 
the pink-tide that previously had 
swept over Latin America has 
receded. Leftist governments in 
Honduras, Paraguay, Argentina, 
and Brazil have all been pushed 
out of office, and center to right-
wing governments have taken 
charge (Main 2017). In the next 
two years, nine Latin American 
nations will hold presidential elec-
tions: Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Costa 
Rica, Paraguay, and Honduras. 
In the era of a Trump presidency, 
the fate of these elections could 
very well depend on the Latin 
American populisms fired up by 
the “caudillo yanqui” to the north 
(Tharoor 2017).2 One such exam-
ple can be found in Mexico, where 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
has seen his polls rise in the four 
months since Trump’s election 
(Moreno 2017).3 In a poll con-
2 “Caudillo yanqui” is a dual reference 
to “caudillo” or the Latin American 
strongman ruler, and “yanqui” the His-
panicization of Yankee, a name used 
for U.S. Americans in Latin America. 
3 Poll numbers can be found in this 
graphic provided by El Financie-
ro through the following webpage: 
<http://graficos.elfinanciero.com.
mx/2017/encuestas/enc-01febre-
ro17/index.html> (08.05.17); the 
question that was asked of participants 
was: “Si los candidatos a la Presiden-
cia de la República en 2018 fueran los 
siguientes, ¿por quién votaría usted? 
(% EFECTIVO)”. In English, it can be 
translated to: “If the candidates for 
the 2018 election for the Presidency 
of the Republic were the following, 
for whom would you vote?”. Since the 
PAN candidate had yet to be officially 
decided, the poll asked hypotheticals, 
wherein Zavala and Anaya were alter-
natively the nominated candidate, to 
gauge fluctuations in opinions across 
other candidates. Between November 
2016 and February 2017, López Ob-
rador gained four points in the polls, 
climbing from 29 % to 33 %, when 
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ducted by El Financiero between 
the 19th and 25th of January, 
2017, López Obrador saw notable 
gains in popularity – regardless 
of the electoral field – when com-
pared to the same survey in No-
vember of 2016 (Moreno 2017). 
Many attribute his rise in popu-
larity to the populism that blos-
somed in the United States lead-
ing up to the 2016 presidential 
election. The anti-immigration, 
anti-Mexican, and overall anti-
Latin American rhetoric that sur-
rounded Trump’s rise to power 
has only served to reinvigorate 
anti-U.S. sentiment in Mexico; 
“Trump – with his brash pledges 
to rewrite Nafta [sic] and stick 
Mexico with the bill for building 
the wall – has created the perfect 
climate for an anti-Trump south 
of the border” (Gamboa 2017; 
Cattan 2017). Riding the wave of 
discontent brought on by Trump’s 
statements, López Obrador has 
moved to the front of the pack. 
Indeed, it seems that the Trump 
presidency will continue to have a 
palpable impact on the numerous 
elections occurring in Latin Amer-
ica within the next two years. 
In conclusion, the political un-
certainty in Latin America, as ex-
emplified by Mexico, represents 
one of the many difficulties that 
the aforementioned internation-
al blocs and organizations must 
confront. CELAC and UNASUR are 
Margarita Zavala was hypothesized as 
the PAN candidate. Zavala fell from 
29 % to 27 % and Miguel Ángel Osorio 
Chong fell from 26 % to 20 %; in an-
other poll, where Ricardo Anaya was 
hypothesized to be the PAN candi-
date instead of Zavala, López Obrador 
gained five points, climbing from 31 % 
to 36 %, whereas Anaya maintained 
23 % and Osorio Chong fell from 27 % 
to 21 %.
perhaps laudable attempts at ini-
tiating a regional dialogue, but 
their constituent countries have 
yet to imbue these organizations 
with any substantial power or ca-
pacities that can endure between 
presidencies. That is to say, the 
frameworks exist and are already 
in place, but there has not been 
an attempt to fully utilize the true 
potential of these institutions. Ad-
ditionally, without permanent or 
binding institutions, new regimes 
and governments are in no way 
beholden to the resolutions draft-
ed by these bodies. While pos-
sible solutions may lie in the re-
gionalization of cooperation, the 
utility of these institutions should 
be taken with a grain of salt. For 
now, they are hopeful glimpses 
of what a more cooperative and 
integrated future might look like. 
The immediate future, however, 
appears to look a bit different; 
President Danilo Medina of the 
Dominican Republic said the fol-
lowing at the CELAC Summit that 
took place in Punta Cana in Janu-
ary of 2017: 
The phantom of protectionism 
and closure of borders would have 
grave consequences. We must do 
everything we can to prevent a 
return to the past […] We are fac-
ing an adverse international sce-
nario. We need to stick together 
to defend our alliance (Newman 
2017).
This need to “stick together” in 
light of “an adverse internation-
al scenario” might be something 
that these nations share, but with 
Trump’s presidency kicking into 
high gear, it is a sentiment that 
must also be backed up with ac-
tion.
The anti-immi-
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rise to power has 
only served to 
reinvigorate anti-
U.S. sentiment in 
Mexico.
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Looking Backwards: 
Comparisons of U.S. 
Isolationism and Nativism 
Across Time 
Before diving into specific charac-
teristics of a Trump-led Western 
Hemisphere, it is first worth the 
effort to contextualize Trump’s 
promises and actions vis-à-vis 
an historical comparison. First, 
and most importantly, it is cru-
cial to note that Trump’s “America 
First” worldview is hardly a new 
phenomenon in the U.S.: while 
it may be extraordinarily short-
sighted, it is not radical in any 
sense of the word. Before its use 
as Trump’s rallying cry, “America 
First” was brandished as the slo-
gan of a U.S. organization found-
ed during the beginning of World 
War II that advocated for U.S. 
non-interference. Susan Dunn, 
a professor at Williams College, 
classifies the America First Com-
mittee as “isolationist, defeatist, 
and anti-Semitic” (Dunn 2016). 
Urging the U.S. government to 
appease Hitler, the America First 
Committee was willing to disre-
gard the atrocities of fascist re-
gimes if that meant avoiding en-
tanglements in a war across the 
Atlantic. Similarities also abound 
between Trump’s semi-isolationist 
and nativist policies and those of 
Hoover during the interwar peri-
od. The justification for decreased 
U.S. involvement on the global 
scale during the Inter-War Period 
bears striking, if not eerie, paral-
lels to the modern U.S. American 
political context: “Disillusionment 
with World War I, international 
commitments that could lead to 
another war, and economic un-
certainty discouraged ambitious 
U.S. involvement in global affairs 
during the interwar period” (Of-
fice of the Historian 2017a). This 
economic uncertainty combined 
with the desire to protect U.S. 
producers and their goods soon 
coalesced into the Hawley-Smoot 
Tariff of 1930. “Raising the aver-
age tariff on dutiable imports by 
nearly 20 percent”, the Hawley-
Smoot Tariff garnered deep inter-
national resentment for the  United 
States, “particularly [seeing] as 
the United States was an interna-
tional creditor and exports to the 
U.S. market were already declin-
ing” (Eichengreen/Irwin 2010: 
875). As the Great Depression 
worsened and international trade 
shrunk, the U.S. enacted one of 
the most protectionist tariffs in its 
history. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 
“provoked retaliatory responses, 
notably from its largest trading 
partner, Canada, as well as from 
a handful of European countries” 
(Eichengreen/Irwin 2010: 875). 
These types of reactions are un-
fortunately not relics of a distant 
past. As North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rene-
gotiations get underway via the 
inauguration of the Trade Promo-
tion Authority (TPA) process, and 
as the U.S.A. steps out of the in-
ternational “free-trade” limelight, 
the United States’ protectionist 
past merits re-examination and 
recognition (Woody 2017). From 
January 1929 to January 1933, 
world trade fell from US $5.3 bil-
lion to US $1.8 billion – a con-
traction of 66 % (The Economist 
2008).4 Naturally, the Hawley-
Smoot Tariff cannot bear all of the 
blame – the Great Depression and 
4 Numerical values taken from figure 
entitled “Down the plughole” in the 
article appearing in The Economist. 
Data sourced from League of Nations’ 
World Economic Survey 1932-1933. 
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deflation were also root causes. 
However, it “certainly made a 
bad situation worse”, and led to 
the almost universal agreement 
that, going forward, a policy of 
free-trade would be in U.S.’s best 
interests (Bartlett 1997: 14-15). 
Whether or not this sentiment will 
endure through the rest of the 
21st century is now up for discus-
sion; if this mutually agreed upon 
strategy is upended by the Trump 
administration, the world eco-
nomic order could begin to show 
signs of increased instability.
The analysis of the Inter-War 
Period by the U.S. Office of the 
Historian goes onto say that, “by 
the mid-1920s […] a general feel-
ing of economic uncertainty re-
inforced isolationist tendencies 
and encouraged new legislation 
that placed severe limits on im-
migration to the United States, 
particularly from Asia” (Office of 
the Historian 2017a). In 1882, 
the Chinese Exclusion Act was 
enacted, marking the first time 
in American history the govern-
ment placed “broad restrictions 
on immigration” by barring Chi-
nese laborers from immigrating 
to the United States (Office of 
the Historian 2017b). Over the 
following 35 years, this discrimi-
nation of the “Other” would only 
intensify, culminating in the Im-
migration Acts of 1917 and 1924. 
These acts respectively barred, 
“entry [from] anyone born in a 
geographically defined ‘Asiatic 
Barred Zone’ except for Japanese 
and Filipinos”, and then excluded 
entry for, “any alien who by virtue 
of race or nationality was ineligi-
ble for citizenship”, which meant 
that in theory all Asians – includ-
ing those of Japanese and Filipino 
descent – and any person of Arab 
descent would be denied admit-
tance to the United States on the 
basis of their race and national-
ity. While the Naturalization Act 
of 1870 allowed “aliens of African 
nativity and […] persons of African 
descent”, to become naturalized, 
this act excluded all non-white, 
non-African persons from attain-
ing naturalization, and therefore, 
it simultaneously excluded these 
groups (Asians and Arabs) from 
immigrating to the U.S.A. follow-
ing the Immigration Act of 1924 
(Office of the Historian 2017c; 
United States Code § 254 sec. 7 
1870).5 These race-based restric-
tions would by and large remain 
in effect up until the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 (Unit-
ed States Code § 66 Stat. 163 
1952).6 With a cursory look back 
into the United States’ past, this 
much is clear: the tripartite set 
of symptoms – nativism, semi-
isolationism, and protectionism – 
described above seems to be re-
emerging in a contemporary con-
text.
Despite the recovery of the U.S. 
economy since the Great Reces-
sion, the country is still deeply un-
sure of what the future will bring. 
In 2017, the story is the same, it 
is just the players who are differ-
ent: the Muslim Middle East and 
Mexico take the place of (East) 
Asia, and the Hawley-Smoot Tar-
iff is replaced by the threat of 
5 United States Code § 254 sec. 7 
(1870) available online at <http://
legisworks.org/sal/16/stats/STAT-
UTE-16-Pg254a.pdf> (08.05.17). 
6 United States Code § 66 Stat. 163 
(1952) available online at <https://
www.gpo.gov/ fdsys/pkg/STAT-
UTE-66/pdf/STATUTE-66-Pg163.pdf> 
(08.05.17)
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huge hikes in import tariffs for 
Mexican goods, the U.S. with-
drawal from future multinational 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 
like the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), and the renegotiations of 
pre-existing FTAs, such as NAFTA 
(Office of the United States Trade 
Representative 2017; Brander 
2017). What makes these prom-
ises so troubling is not the lack of 
precedent, but rather that Trump 
is endeavoring to rehash century-
old decisions within a drastically 
different global context. One can 
certainly debate the risks posed 
by the TPP to workers’ rights and 
the environment and discuss the 
negative effects of NAFTA on a low 
income American factory worker. 
However, Trump’s unilateralism 
and unwillingness to fully recog-
nize the complex interdependen-
cies at play make these decisions 
reasonably worrisome. Even 
though Trump may not advocate 
for an outright immigration ban 
for all Mexicans or Muslims, the 
restrictions that he hopes to place 
on the movement of certain eth-
nic and religious groups mark a 
pronounced departure from the 
last several administrations – 
though, as is seen, it is not with-
out presidential precedent. When 
the aforementioned plans and 
orders are considered en masse, 
Trump’s desire to positively and 
productively engage with Latin 
America is called into question. 
Many of Trump’s adherents would 
argue these doubts are restricted 
only to the most liberal of U.S. 
American political circles, yet, 
the Latin American Right and Left 
are undoubtedly taking heed. On 
February 21, Javier Bolaños – the 
current president of the Mexican 
Chamber of Deputies and mem-
ber of the conservative National 
Action Party (PAN) – called on 
Latin American ambassadors to 
sound their, “clear and resound-
ing rejection of all the xenophobic 
expressions from the president of 
the United States, Donald Trump” 
(Xinhua 2017). This call for a re-
ignited Pan-Latin-Americanism 
in light of a Trump Presidency is 
in no way exclusively Mexican in 
origin. Calls for a consolidation 
in regional commercial and politi-
cal organizations like the Bolivar-
ian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA), the Common 
Southern Market (MERCOSUR), 
and the Pacific Alliance (PA), 
have originated from many gov-
ernments, both progressive and 
conservative.
 
Internal Dynamics and Power 
Hierarchies within the Trump 
Administration
Before diving into how Latin 
America can react to Trump’s leg-
islation and diplomacy, one must 
first try to forecast what exactly 
this legislation and diplomacy 
might look like. Rather than taking 
Trump’s speeches as unadulterat-
ed truth, one must take Trump’s 
public rhetoric and temper it with 
reality of the Trump administra-
tion. Rather than Trump holding 
unanimous decision-making pow-
er behind the U.S.A.’s relationship 
with Latin America, it is his team 
of advisors and cabinet members 
that will certainly take the reins 
in navigating this uneven diplo-
matic terrain. Who exactly makes 
up this team? With key posts in 
the State Department still empty, 
this is a question that continues 
to puzzle many. Therefore, it may 
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be best to start at the source of 
many of these questions: the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC).7 
Within the first 30 days of his in-
auguration, Trump fired the two 
most senior, experienced advisors 
on Latin America within the NSC: 
Craig Deare and Michael Flynn. 
Then, in a second wave of ap-
pointees, the older, tougher mili-
tary brass arrived. Three weeks 
later, Trump nominated Gen. Rick 
Waddell of the Army Reserve to 
fill Deare’s slot (Isacson 2017). 
Despite holding the position since 
early March, there is almost no 
news or information about this 
appointment on the internet. Rick 
Waddell, with experience as se-
nior director for European Affairs 
for the Bush Jr. NSC, is no strang-
er to politics and the goings-on 
of D.C. Isacson likens Waddell to 
Gen. H. R. McMaster, Flynn’s re-
placement as national security 
advisor. Isacson also points out 
that Waddell’s literature indicates 
a personal penchant for low-in-
tensity conflict and counterin-
surgency campaigns, an analysis 
backed up by Dr. Gregory Weeks. 
It is quite possible that this pro-
clivity will manifest itself in brief-
ings given to President Trump 
concerning Latin America. Ac-
cording to Dr. Weeks’ analysis of 
Waddell’s only book to focus on 
Latin America, In War’s Shadow: 
Waging Peace in Central Ameri-
ca, he is a staunch opponent of 
applying dependency theory to 
Central America and denies cat-
egorizing U.S. actions in Latin 
America as imperialist (Weeks 
2017). The concluding paragraph 
7 The National Security Council is a 
conglomeration of advisors and offi-
cials that advise and council the pres-
ident in matters of national security 
and foreign policy.
of Weeks’ article speaks volumes 
on Waddell:
Low intensity conflict had a major 
impact on Waddell, who kept writ-
ing about how the Army needed 
to adapt to new realities of con-
flict. As he concludes with satis-
faction, “all too often freedom 
still proceeds from the barrel of 
a gun” (Waddell 1992: 205). And 
he’s now advising the president 
on Latin America (Weeks 2017). 
Alongside Waddell in the second 
wave of appointees stands Gen. 
H. R. McMaster. As national securi-
ty advisor, he will hopefully speak 
truth to power within the Trump 
administration. He is known pri-
marily for “writing the book” on 
Vietnam and for his extensive 
military involvement in the Middle 
East: not much is known about 
his views or opinions on Latin 
America policy, and it is therefore 
difficult to predict how he will af-
fect the crafting of foreign policy. 
What these two appointments 
do show is the militarization of 
foreign policy creation. With so 
many civilian posts in State and 
Defense empty, it is the military 
that seems to be shouldering re-
sponsibility for foreign policy in 
the interregnum. Irrespective 
of their opinions and ideologies, 
however, these particular advi-
sors fill consular roles within the 
NSC and possess no authority to 
dictate defense policy or foreign 
relations as Cabinet members do. 
The most these military officers 
can do is to advise the president 
– whether or not Trump will listen 
is the operative question. Apart 
from the inner sanctum that is 
the National Security Council, 
who seems to be stepping up on 
matters of Latin American affairs?
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For one, Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson seems to be at the fore-
front of engaging, and disengag-
ing, with U.S. foreign policy on 
Latin America. In February 2017, 
Tillerson went to Mexico on a 
bridge-building trip. Ultimately, 
however, he was forced to defend 
Trump’s proposals for the con-
struction of a border wall, mass 
deportations, and the deporta-
tion of non-Mexican citizens to 
Mexico (Browne/Gaouette 2017). 
One might also look to Secretary 
of Homeland Security John Kelly, 
a retired Marine Corps General, 
who accompanied Tillerson on 
his trip to Mexico. Kelly has been 
a vocal advocate for a stricter, 
more stringent border policy and 
is thought of as a member of the 
“Axis of Adults” within the Trump 
administration, just like Tillerson 
and Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis, who is also a retired Ma-
rine Corps General (Dozier 2017). 
It seems, however, that despite 
the official charges entrusted 
men like Tillerson, Mattis, or Kel-
ly, one of the most powerful for-
eign policy advisors to the presi-
dent, the one with the president’s 
ear, moves in circles entirely re-
moved from the Cabinet: son-in-
law  Jared Kushner. 
Jared Kushner, the 36-year-old 
senior advisor to the president, 
has neither foreign policy nor 
governmental experience. None-
theless, as the billionaire heir to 
a real estate empire, Kushner has 
been able to craft a niche posi-
tion for himself within the ad-
ministration of his father-in-law. 
A Vanity Fair article investigates 
the connections Kushner has to 
the administration and the roles 
he plays, both officially and un-
officially. The article says the fol-
lowing: 
The source close to the situation 
said that Kushner, Tillerson, Mat-
tis, and John Kelly are all work-
ing together as a team, and in-
stead of seeing Kushner as a rival 
secretary of state, they view him 
as a honest broker between the 
president, foreign leaders, and 
Cabinet secretaries. So when Til-
lerson was preparing for his trip 
to Mexico last week, according 
to this source, the triumvirate 
of Kushner, Tillerson, and Kelly 
planned and executed this trip to-
gether. It was the three of them 
who briefed President Trump on 
the trip (Fox 2017).
Kushner is seen by many as a go-
between for Trump. This applies 
not only to intra-White House af-
fairs, but intercontinental ones as 
well. Fox goes onto say:
Foreign leaders began commu-
nicating with Kushner more than 
six months ago when it became 
clear that his father-in-law would 
be the nominee, and the rela-
tionships he’s build with dozens 
of them have carried over into 
the White House, the source said 
(Fox 2017). 
While Kushner’s stance on Latin 
American policy is still undevel-
oped and unclear, he has never-
theless met with Mexico’s Foreign 
Minister Luis Videgaray to discuss 
a major Trump speech and has 
tried to arrange for a presiden-
tial visit from Mexican President 
Peña Nieto: indeed, “Kushner’s 
back-channel communications 
with Mexico – the full extent of 
which has not been previously re-
ported – reveal him to be almost 
a shadow-secretary of state, op-
erating outside the boundaries 
of the State Department or the 
It seems, howev-
er, that despite 
the official charg-
es entrusted men 
like Tillerson, 
Mattis, or Kelly, 
one of the most 
powerful foreign 
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NSC” (Rucker/Parker/Partlow 
2017). When the visit was later 
aborted by the Mexican presi-
dent due to a controversial Tweet 
posted by Trump, Kushner was 
left fuming (Fox 2017). Unlike a 
seasoned politician, diplomat, or 
governmental official who flaunts 
published literature, Kushner is 
a total outsider; this makes him 
particularly difficult to position 
in relation to ideology or policy 
– especially vis-à-vis Latin Amer-
ica. There is no clear inkling what 
his views might be towards, say, 
Argentina or Colombia, Peru or 
Vene zuela. What is clear, howev-
er, is that he – perhaps more than 
anyone else in terms of foreign 
policy – has the ear of the presi-
dent, which means his ideas are 
crucial in gauging the future of 
U.S. foreign policy towards Latin 
America.
Alongside Kushner and Kelly 
in this so-called “triumvirate” 
stands Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson.8 Before becoming Sec-
retary of State, Rex Tillerson 
gained world-wide renown as 
CEO of ExxonMobil Corp. As the 
New York Times states, “neither 
a diplomat, solider nor politician, 
he is an unconventional choice for 
the job, but has vast international 
experience” (Harris 2017). Such 
international experience includes, 
for example, being awarded the 
Russian “Order of Friendship” by 
Vladimir Putin – one of the high-
est awards given to foreigners – 
and getting in a tussle with Nico-
8 The “triumvirate” refers to the quote 
from the Fox article in Vanity Fair and 
includes Tillerson, Kelly, and Kushner. 
This varies from the “Axis of Adults” 
which is comprised principally of Til-
lerson, Mattis, and Kelly and is refer-
enced in Dozier’s article in the Daily 
Beast. 
las Maduro following Venezuela’s 
nationalization of the petroleum 
industry, a decision that cost Exx-
onMobil some US $10 billion and 
that Tillerson took as a personal 
affront (Egan/Horowitz/Isidore 
2016; O’Reilly 2017). Despite 
this previous disagreement, how-
ever, Tillerson does not seem to 
have it out for Maduro (O’Reilly 
2017; Latin America Goes Global 
2017).9 He has also come out in 
favor of rolling back Obama-era 
regulations on Cuba and re-ex-
amining the U.S.’s support of the 
Colombian peace process and the 
resulting accords’ implementa-
tion (Latin America Goes Global 
2017). 
Regardless of the professed pol-
icy goals publicized by the ad-
ministration and its constituent 
members, it is the everyday po-
litical realities of Washington that 
end up determining how and for 
what ends policy is formed – Lat-
in American policy included. The 
dynamics in play within the presi-
dent’s inner circle are crucial to 
understand how foreign policy will 
develop. While Kushner has the 
benefit of filling a flexible adviso-
ry role outside of the president’s 
Cabinet, Tillerson is encumbered 
by the bureaucratic apparatus that 
accompanies the State Depart-
ment. In order to make this ad-
ministrative behemoth function, 
it must have its working parts in 
place; that means that qualified 
civil servants must be hired to 
carry out the president’s foreign 
policy. This, however, could not 
9 The latter is, according to Latin Amer-
ica Goes Global, “a text of the written 
answers on U.S. policy towards Latin 
America and the Caribbean Rex Tiller-
son submitted to the Senate for his 
confirmation hearing”.
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be farther from the State Depart-
ment’s current position. To begin, 
Tillerson’s senior staff at State is 
vacant – save a few acting hold-
overs from the Obama adminis-
tration who are working on bor-
rowed time (U.S. Department of 
State 2017).10 The Senate seems 
ready to begin the nomination 
processes for these much-needed 
officials, yet, as Ranking Mem-
ber of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Sen. Ben Cardin 
(D-MD) says, “there’s no one to 
speak on behalf of the Trump ad-
ministration” present at any of 
these hearings (Kelemen 2017). 
Within the first 100 days in office, 
Trump has only had 27 key nomi-
nees successfully confirmed by 
the Senate. This statistic pales in 
comparison to 69 for Obama, 35 
for G. W. Bush, 49 for Clinton, and 
50 for H. W. Bush. (The Washing-
ton Post 2017). As of May 10th, 
2017, the only positions requir-
ing Senate confirmation that 
were filled in the State Depart-
ment were secretary of State, the 
ambassador to Israel, and U.S. 
representative to the UN: five 
ambassadorships and the depu-
ty secretary were awaiting con-
firmation, three more positions 
were awaiting official nomination, 
and 106 further positions lacked 
any prospective nominee (The 
Washington Post 2017). While 
Trump has nominated a deputy 
secretary of State, a move that 
took more than 12 weeks, John 
J. Sullivan still must be formally 
confirmed (The White House, Of-
fice of the Press Secretary 2017). 
10 Although there are two positions cur-
rently filled out of the nine that make 
up State’s senior staff, they are work-
ing on a provisional basis and are not 
permanent Trump appointees to said 
positions. 
This means that the current sta-
tus quo of Tillerson being the 
“only Senate-confirmed official 
selected by Trump anywhere in-
side the State Department build-
ing” will continue for some time 
(Gearan/Morello 2017). A major 
problem with this arrangement is 
that, “with assistant secretary of 
state positions occupied only by 
‘acting’ deputies” many diplomats 
and foreign officials “have no one 
of authority to contact” (Gearan/
Morello 2017). This nebulous 
chain of command is just one of 
several variabilities sapping the 
State Department of its interna-
tional legitimacy.
In addition to the internal uncer-
tainties, an external variable also 
seems to be clouding the State 
Department’s current role. It is 
said by multiple anonymous ad-
ministration sources, according 
to an article in Politico, that Jared 
Kushner’s interactions with for-
eign governments (Japan, Mexico, 
Israel to name a few), are “caus-
ing consternation at Foggy Bot-
tom, as top State Department of-
ficials, foreign policy experts and 
embassy officials are frozen out of 
foreign policy decisions and often 
unsure who is doing what, or who 
is responsible” (Stokols/Dawsey 
2017). This lack of clear hierar-
chy or role specialization means 
that it is difficult to associate one 
or two people with the crafting of 
Latin American foreign policy. Ad-
ditionally, with many career dip-
lomats left out of the loop, there 
is no sense of constancy or reli-
ability. While one would assume 
that a Cabinet-level position – i.e. 
Sec. of State Tillerson – would 
be the point person in relations 
It is said by mul-
tiple anonymous 
administration 
sources, accord-
ing to an article 
in Politico, that 
Jared Kushner’s 
interactions with 
foreign govern-
ments (Japan, 
Mexico, Israel 
to name a few), 
are “causing 
consternation at 
Foggy Bottom, as 
top State Depart-
ment officials, 
foreign policy 
experts and em-
bassy officials 
are frozen out 
of foreign policy 
decisions and 
often unsure who 
is doing what, or 
who is respon-
sible”.
Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 15
with diplomats and governments 
from the Caribbean and Central 
and South America, the limits of 
his influence are being discussed 
within many D.C. circles; these 
discussions first started as a 
whisper and are now being had at 
a yell. In a move unseen in mod-
ern administrations, Tillerson’s 
State Department waited almost 
seven weeks to hold its first press 
conference. In fact, the first time 
he even sat down with the press, 
it was with one friendly journalist 
whom he hand-picked to accom-
pany him on his East Asia trip mid-
March. This one-on-one interview 
not only broke precedent upon 
precedent in terms of transparen-
cy and access, but also revealed 
that Tillerson neither sought after 
nor wanted the job of secretary 
of State (McPike 2017). While he 
may still be adjusting to this new 
position, his silence nonetheless 
speaks volumes: unless dynam-
ics change, and change soon, 
it is possible that he will not be 
taken seriously by both the me-
dia and/or the administration. If 
that is the case, then his ability 
to conduct foreign policy on the 
part of the United States would 
be thrown into jeopardy. 
An example of such a consequen-
tial exclusion might be the hap-
penings of March 9, 2017, when 
Mexican Foreign Minister Vide-
garay came to Washington, D.C. 
and headed straight for the White 
House for a meeting with Jared 
Kushner and a couple of other ad-
visors. Notably absent from this 
meeting was Videgaray’s coun-
terpart, Sec. of State Tillerson 
(Wilkinson 2017). When asked 
about the meeting, the Secretary 
of State spokesperson seemed to 
have no idea that Videgaray was 
even in town (Wilkinson 2017). 
Even though Tillerson was said 
to have spoken to Videgaray by 
phone, it was nonetheless a case 
of bad optics for the Secretary 
of State. It did little to help the 
image of a closed-off secretary 
that continues to pop up through-
out media and policy coverage. 
In Tillerson’s defense, his sup-
porters believe that he is tread-
ing lightly and making big gains 
behind closed doors, shunning 
the lime light and eschewing the 
cameras in order to “make the 
boss look better” (McPike 2017). 
Others say that it is far too soon 
to start throwing around judge-
ments concerning his efficacy: a 
proper evaluation must be put on 
hold until more actions and state-
ments are collected as evidence 
(Inboden 2017). Tillerson himself 
argues that much of business is 
done behind closed boardroom 
doors: foreign affairs, however, is 
not another iteration of a multina-
tional company. Perceptions mat-
ter, and for diplomacy, percep-
tions are almost everything. In 
closing, one overarching conclu-
sion is laid bare; moving forward, 
the power dynamic amongst the 
upper echelons of Trump’s advi-
sors and confidants will be of ut-
most importance if one is to as-
sess the flow of influence within 
the administration. Depending 
on the flow of influence, distinct 
parts of the executive apparatus 
will in turn find themselves em-
powered to or forbidden from 
taking the reins in crafting Latin 
American policy.
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Demographic, Cultural, 
and Commercial Exchanges 
Between the U.S. and Latin 
America
The U.S.-Latin American relation-
ship – or rather series of many 
bilateral and multilateral relation-
ships – is made up of an enor-
mous number of connections in 
which money, influence, ideas, 
power, and people flow in both 
directions, albeit perhaps not al-
ways with the same intensity. For 
centuries, the United States has 
played a major role in the econo-
mies and political regimes of Latin 
America: that is a fact. However, 
Latin America has also exercised 
a fair share of its influence on the 
U.S.A. via culture, language, and 
demography. As of the 2012 U.S. 
Census, 16.95 % of the popula-
tion identified as Hispanic (United 
States Census 2012). Additionally, 
some 12.9 % of U.S. Americans, 
or ~37,579,787 persons, speak 
Spanish at home, and around 
18 %, or ~52,988,755 U.S. resi-
dents, are able to speak Spanish 
with some degree of proficiency 
(Ryan 2013; Tharoor 2015).11 
Furthermore, the Spanish Foreign 
Ministry and the Instituto Cer-
vantes, released a report in De-
cember of 2015 that declared that 
by 2050, the United States “will 
be the leading Spanish-speaking 
country in the world” outrank-
ing both Spain and Mexico (Cer-
vantes Institute 2015). A final 
example of the strength of Latin 
American and Hispanic culture in 
the U.S.A. can be seen in Ameri-
cans’ television viewing habits: 
Univision and Telemundo, both 
U.S. American Spanish language 
broadcast networks, ranked 5th 
11 These are not exact figures, but esti-
mations using given percentages. 
and 8th respectively amongst the 
most watched ad-supported net-
works among adults aged 18-49 
in 2016, with a combined view-
ership of over 1,600,000 people 
(Schneider 2016).12 It is clear 
that in 2017, borders are porous, 
both for people and for culture. 
The United States exists alongside 
Latin America in an international 
system characterized by global-
ization and deep inter-/intraconti-
nental interactions. The “my way 
or the highway” policy that Trump 
favors will not function in 2017 
– the world is no longer unipolar 
and the United States is continu-
ally losing international credibil-
ity, especially within Latin Amer-
ica. The world looks drastically 
different now than it did in 1989 
following the fall of the U.S.S.R., 
and the current world order will 
simply not allow for the re-emer-
gence of a unipolar  power. In this 
day and age, the United States 
finds itself questioning, “whether 
it really needs to play the world’s 
policeman, whether peace really 
is always beneficial, and whether 
far-off conflicts really are worth 
wading into” (Baker 2017). If this 
is the case, what can Latin Ameri-
ca do to avoid an “every-man-for-
himself” type of strategy as the 
U.S. wrestles with its own inter-
national identity? 
It would be naïve to say that Lat-
in America can simply disengage 
from the United States. This is 
not possible now, nor has it been 
possible since the proclamation 
of the Monroe Doctrine. Of course 
12 Data acquired from: Nielsen. Prime 
time total viewers, Live+7; Broad-
cast data: 12/28/15-12/4/16 and 
12/29/14-12/6/15; Cable data: 
12/28/15-12/18/16, most current, 
and 12/29/14-12/27/15.
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this assertion runs in the other di-
rection as well: the U.S. cannot 
realistically construct an impen-
etrable wall between itself and 
Latin America that keeps people, 
language, and culture out while 
funneling through money. The 
two parties share a deeply inter-
dependent relationship, and the 
quality of this relationship should 
be recognized so that pragmatic 
solutions might be crafted. For 
example, while Trump professes 
that he can dictate the renegotia-
tion of NAFTA down to the tiniest 
detail and assumes Mexico must 
subsequently acquiesce because 
of its dependence on the U.S. 
American market, he overlooks 
the fact that Mexico is the U.S.’s 
number two export destination 
and number three import origin 
(Simoes/Hidalgo 2011). While the 
United States is an unarguable 
economic powerhouse, this vital-
ity does not mean that the U.S. 
can interact with the world via a 
one-way, unilateral approach. 
It may seem like Mexico is depen-
dent on the U.S. for trade due to 
the differing degrees of trade reli-
ance, but Mexico is crucial to the 
United States’ economy as well. 
There are many intertwined mar-
kets and production chains, such 
as the auto industry, that rely on 
vibrant and voluminous trade be-
tween the two countries. This mu-
tually beneficial and ever-growing 
relationship cannot simply be up-
ended because “America Comes 
First”. Such a move would much 
more likely have the opposite ef-
fect by putting the U.S.’s position 
within deep production chains at 
risk. If NAFTA dies, the U.S.A. will 
see huge losses as intra-regional 
trade (in the form of foodstuffs), 
as well as trade with China (in the 
form of technology) and the EU 
(in the form of heavy machinery), 
is increasingly incentivized in Lat-
in America (O’Neil 2017). Mexico 
is not the only nation that relies 
on the U.S. as a vital trade part-
ner and export market. As is seen 
above, the United States makes 
up a crucial part of many Latin 
American economies, particularly 
those in Central America. 
Many of these Latin American 
countries, especially in the North-
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ern Triangle Region of Central 
America, rely heavily on the U.S. 
as a crucial trade partner. Even 
Venezuela depends on the U.S.A. 
for commerce: a country that has 
adamantly vocalized their disdain 
of U.S. efforts to interfere in their 
domestic affairs. In light of these 
dependencies, these states can-
not put this commercial relation-
ship at risk, regardless of who 
sits in the Oval Office. Utilizing 
 another analytical lens, it would 
also be in the U.S. president’s 
best interests not to jeopardize 
the U.S.-Latin American trade 
flow – a trade flow that accounts 
for 23.2 % of U.S. exports and 
18.5 % of U.S. imports (Simoes/
Hidalgo 2011). 
The commercial relationship be-
tween Latin America and the 
U.S.A. is numerically significant, 
yet it does not preclude these 
countries from looking elsewhere 
for future partnerships and op-
portunities. Such an example 
would certainly be Chile, and this 
LAC’s path could very well set the 
stage for alternative commercial 
diversification later on down the 
road. As one of the Latin Ameri-
can countries most committed to 
free trade, along with Peru, Chile 
leads the pack in seeking out 
deepened international connec-
tions that broach the Pacific. On 
the 14th and 15th of March 2017, 
Chile hosted representatives from 
12 countries that once formed 
the hoped-for TPP, plus China 
and South Korea, to discuss a 
path forward following the U.S.’s 
withdrawal and the agreement’s 
subsequent demise (Shepherd 
2017). Then in April of 2017, 
Chile convened a meeting of for-
eign ministers from PA and MER-
COSUR to discuss ways of further 
integrating trade. Finally, in Janu-
ary of 2018, Chile will convene a 
foreign ministers’ meeting of the 
CELAC regional diplomatic group 
with China to talk about “more 
trade, more opening, [and] more 
regional integration” (Oppen-
heimer 2017). In light of China’s 
presence in these high level meet-
ings, Chile’s Foreign Minister, Her-
aldo Muñoz has said that, “his-
tory teaches us that when there 
are empty spaces in politics and 
in actions, those spaces are filled 
by other players” (Oppenheimer 
2017). This “empty space” most 
likely refers to the absence of any 
senior U.S. trade official at these 
summits. The seemingly inversely 
proportional relationship between 
a rise in China’s influence and a 
decrease in the United States’ 
clout has more evidence than just 
representation at good-will sum-
mits, however. 
Figure 2 shows the destination 
of South and Central American 
exports between the ten-year 
period stretching from 2006 to 
2015. As can be seen, the U.S.A. 
receives exports from the South 
and Central American region at a 
comparable level to the amount 
of intra-region exports. In any 
case, the U.S.A. clearly leads Chi-
na. It should be noted that be-
tween 2011 and 2015, total trade 
exports from the region to the 
world decreased some 29.12 %, 
from US $761,380 million to 
US $539,655 million.
It is clear here that the U.S.A. 
leads China in importing goods 
from South and Central America 
in gross terms. What is essential 
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to examine though, is the change 
in the depth of both countries’ 
trade relationships with Central 
and South America, i.e. in terms 
of comparative growth or retrac-
tion. Some attribute China’s de-
crease in trade volume with Latin 
America as a sign of a Sino-Latin 
cooling, but they fail to take into 
account the comparative nature 
of said decrease. Figure 3 shows 
the share of exports received by 
each region, but this time, as a 
percentage of total exports to the 
world from the South and Central 
American region.
While in 2006 the U.S. received 
29.39 % and China received 
6.17 % of exports from  Central 
and South America, in 2015 
those values stood at 21.66 % 
and 13.60 % respectively, which 
amounts to a decrease of 7.73 % 
for the U.S.A. and increase of 
7.43 % for China. Even though in 
2015, the U.S. was still a more 
profitable export market for 
South and Central America, the 
growth in the China-Latin Ameri-
can relationship is significant and 
seems to be on track to continue 
growing. In fact, China is now 
the biggest export destination for 
Peru, Chile, and Brazil (Simoes/
Hidalgo 2011). Latin America is 
increasingly looking westwards 
for more lucrative trade deals, 
and with the numerous summits 
planned for this year and next, 
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from South and 
Central America 
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China is seen by some global 
economists to be taking the reins 
in the current global free-trade 
order (Pesek 2017). While some 
experts believe China cannot 
possibly fill the role of the U.S. 
in this neoliberal, transparent 
global economy, it has undeniably 
taken on a more powerful role in 
fomenting and guiding commer-
cial growth within the South and 
Central American region (Holmes 
2017; Capri 2017). The growth 
of Chinese influence vis-à-vis the 
U.S.A.’s diplomatic, economic, 
and social disengagement from 
the Latin American region ex-
emplifies a sticking point for the 
Trump administration: a laissez-
faire policy is no longer tenable in 
21st century Latin America. 
With US $1.5 billion being allo-
cated in the 2018 FY U.S. gov-
ernment budget for the construc-
tion of a border wall and a deep, 
multi-billion dollar cut in foreign 
aid, Trump has set the stage for 
the next year of his presidency. 
The following issues are all now 
in play, if not already in motion: 
the retreat from multination-
al institutions and international 
agreements; the doubt cast on 
the U.S.’s support of the Colom-
bian peace process; the threat 
of tariffs, taxes, and diminished 
funding for Mexico; and the un-
doing of the Cuban rapproche-
ment (Latin America Goes Global 
2017). While this new set of pro-
tocols does not take the shape of 
a 180° change, the changes here 
are nevertheless patent. In hopes 
of avoiding cynicism, there are 
concrete actions Latin America 
can take advantage of that could 
empower them and give them ex-
panded influence over U.S.-Latin 
American policy. With most of 
Latin America considered as terra 
incognita to Trump, the LACs are 
confronted with a promising op-
portunity: “Latin American gov-
ernments may do well to engage 
as a group on specific issues – 
such as energy or security – as 
opposed to a ‘pure’ bilateral basis, 
which may not be a priority for 
the new administration” (Winter 
2017). For example, Paraguay is 
stronger with MERCOSUR than it 
is alone, Bolivia can attract more 
diplomatic attention through 
UNA SUR than it can alone, and 
the Dominican Republic benefits 
from a louder voice in CELAC than 
it would otherwise. The strength, 
prosperity, and stability of Latin 
America are in the U.S.A.’s best 
security interests, as well. When 
Latin America can control drug 
trade and ensure rule of law and 
accountability, the United States 
undoubtedly benefits. How can 
Latin America convey these prin-
ciples to the Trump administra-
tion? The next section will focus 
on strategies and options avail-
able to Latin America to further 
activate their role in the bilateral 
U.S.-Latin American relationship. 
Charting a New Course: Latin 
America’s Path Forward 
Following Trump’s victory in No-
vember, many Latin American 
presidents exhibited caution and 
reserve in their reactions, hoping 
to avoid provoking a negative re-
sponse from the new U.S. com-
mander-in-chief. Shortly after 
Trump’s inauguration, at the 2017 
CELAC Summit, Ecuadorian Presi-
dent Rafael Correa, said the fol-
lowing: “we have to protect our-
With US $1.5 bil-
lion being allo-
cated in the 2018 
FY U.S. govern-
ment budget for 
the construc-
tion of a border 
wall and a deep, 
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aid, Trump has 
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the next year of 
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The following is-
sues are all now 
in play, if not al-
ready in motion: 
the retreat from 
multinational 
institutions and 
international 
agreements; the 
doubt cast on the 
U.S.’s support of 
the Colombian 
peace process; 
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ing for Mexico; 
and the undoing 
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selves from the aggressive policy 
of persecuting migrants” (New-
man 2017). Later, in an interview 
with Spain’s Cadena Ser, he said 
that there needs to be, “a regional 
stand to defend the main type of 
mobility, which is human mobil-
ity, the defense of human rights, 
reminding the United States that 
they have been a country of mi-
grants” (teleSUR 2017). Bolivian 
President Evo Morales said, via 
Twitter, that he hopes to work 
with Trump, “against racism, ma-
chismo, and anti-immigration for 
the sovereignty of our peoples” 
(Gonzalez et. al. 2016). Even 
though these statements appear 
to admonish Trump’s plans, the 
more rebellious presidents were 
sure to avoid specifically men-
tioning Trump or attacking him 
personally, instead favoring a 
more indirect, though neverthe-
less pointed, approach. Other 
statesmen, like Manuel Santos 
of Colombia and Temer of Bra-
zil congratulated Trump without 
qualification and clarified their in-
terest in continuing to deepen bi-
lateral ties between their nations 
and the U.S.A. (Gonzalez et. al. 
2016). Almost across the board, 
Latin American presidents called 
for continued cooperation and 
tended to be scant on responses 
to his previous comments and 
promises. While Latin America 
was by no means behind Trump 
in the campaign, they opted for 
a pragmatic and muted approach 
following the announcement of 
Trump as the 45th president of the 
United States. 
A common aspect of these reac-
tions was a focus on the bilateral 
facet of their respective relation-
ships with the United States. A 
“bilateral relationship” clearly im-
plies the existence of two play-
ers – not just one. As former First 
Lady of Mexico, Margarita Zavala 
said concerning Mexico’s ties with 
the U.S.A., “there is no issue in 
the bilateral relationship that the 
United States can take on alone, 
whether it be migration, security, 
or climate change” (Gonzalez et. 
al. 2016). That is to say, while the 
U.S.A. may possess the prepon-
derance of power in their bilateral 
relationships with the individual 
states that comprise Latin Amer-
ica, they do not possess a mo-
nopoly of it. In effort to further 
strengthen their positions vis-à-
vis the U.S.A., it would be prudent 
of Latin America to think about 
ways in which they might com-
bine and fuse their voices, when 
interests and opportunity win-
dows align, so that they may bring 
more consequential thoughts and 
opinions to the table. With the 
“Great Negotiator” now sitting 
in the Oval Office, Latin America 
should use the multiple institu-
tions, frameworks, and organiza-
tions that have already been es-
tablished to project a more united 
voice in the conveyance of their 
nations’ desired policies to the 
United States. It is crucial to note 
here that this call for increased 
cooperation is not a call for the 
creation of new umbrella institu-
tions and trade agreements. The 
solution is not to throw more in-
stitutions and organizations at 
the problem. Rather, what might 
be the region’s best bet is the uti-
lization of already established in-
stitutions at sub-regional, region-
al, and continental levels – such 
as CELAC, UNASUR, MERCOSUR, 
PA, ALBA, etc. – in order to apply 
In effort to fur-
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substantive pressure and signal-
ing to the United States. Despite 
their youth and somewhat under-
developed structure, these insti-
tutions have made some tangible 
gains in the last half decade and 
possess the capability to continue 
doing so. 
From solving intra-regional dis-
putes to strengthening the re-
gion’s commercial profile in East 
Asia, these aforementioned insti-
tutions can play a role in the fu-
ture of U.S.-Latin American rela-
tions. To do so, however, they all 
have to be willing to talk to the 
United States. While CELAC will 
dialogue with gusto with China 
and the European Union, it has not 
yet affirmed its desire to initiate 
dialogue with the United States. 
Until CELAC decides to do so, its 
full potential to play a hemispher-
ic role will likewise be limited. In 
light of the uncertainty that hov-
ers over U.S. foreign policy un-
der Trump, Latin America would 
do well to shore up intraregional 
integrity and prepare to rely and 
support one another. With an un-
interested – or, at a minimum, in-
different – U.S. president and a 
mutually shared – although not 
unanimous – consensus amongst 
the people and presidents of Lat-
in America that more integration 
would be favorable, now is the 
time to activate these organiza-
tions in the way they were meant 
to be. It could very well turn out 
that unexpected affinities develop 
between formerly unsuspecting 
partners.
Finding Common Ground?  
An Argument for a Mixture of 
Optimism and Pragmatism
While the suggestions made 
above provide alternatives, Latin 
America cannot subsist on deeper 
intra-regional integration alone. 
Efforts must be made to engage 
in dialogue with the United States, 
by means of organizations and 
institutions mentioned above. As 
surprising as it is, the Left in Latin 
America may be able to dialogue 
with Trump just as easily as the 
Right. Despite his railing against 
Trump’s rhetoric and immigration 
stances, Evo Morales sent out one 
remarkable Tweet on November 
10, 2016, that clarified a con-
vergence of ideologies between 
Trump and Morales. He tweeted, 
“Why did Donald Trump win? Be-
cause this was a vote against 
failed globalization and the bar-
barism of war, against the un-
hinged free market.”13 Like many 
Leftist Latin American politicians, 
Trump ran his campaign speaking 
out against the ills of neoliberal 
globalization and the internation-
alization of economies. Both the 
farmer in the foothills of the An-
des and the coal miner in the 
foothills of Appalachia are put at 
a disadvantage by globalization. 
This anti-globalization sentiment 
may be the entryway for nations 
like those belonging to ALBA to 
initiate a dialogue with the presi-
dent, building upon shared opin-
ions: Maduro himself said that 
“[Trump] won’t be worse than 
Obama” (Crooks 2017). Critics 
of Trump from both the right and 
left have accused him of being a 
13 Original Tweet available here: 
<https://twitter.com/evoespueb-
lo/status/796701346254778368> 
(08.05.17).
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man without principles or ideol-
ogy; if this is indeed the case, the 
Leftist character of ALBA mem-
ber states should not preclude 
further agreements and deals 
between them and the United 
States. For example, who is to 
say Morales and Trump would 
never work together to defend 
human rights in the face of the 
“barbarism of war”? On April 18th, 
the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 
Nikki Haley “presided over what 
the [Trump] administration called 
the first ‘thematic debate’ on hu-
man rights in the Security Coun-
cil” (Sengupta 2017). Bolivia, like 
the United States, is also a mem-
ber of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, and perhaps this 
shared commitment coupled with 
the necessary opportunity win-
dow to facilitate cooperation can 
be taken advantage of by both 
countries.
In the end, however, Trump’s 
presidency will most likely not 
make or break Latin American ad-
ministrations. Though his  rhetoric 
may vary from his predecessors, 
his core policies will not. While 
he may disengage from certain 
international institutions and re-
duce aid packages that former 
presidents had promised, he will 
most likely maintain a steady and 
sizeable military presence in the 
region – especially considering 
his advisory staff is composed of 
almost entirely military men. The 
greatest threats to Latin America 
are not those emanating from 
Trump, but rather those of in-
equality, poverty, impunity, cor-
ruption, police militarization, and 
drug trafficking. These problems 
may not attract the attention of 
Trump, but they must be con-
fronted and dealt with by Latin 
American leaders themselves. 
That being said, Trump does pos-
sess enough influence in the re-
gion to tilt Latin American states 
in one direction or the other – as 
is seen in incremental gains in 
popularity of López Obrador in 
Mexico. With the pull he has over 
Latin America, Trump may not 
be able to play kingmaker, but 
he can play a participatory role 
by engaging some leaders while 
leaving others, namely Maduro, 
out in the cold. 
With Trump’s “First 100 Days” 
now behind him, not much can 
be definitively said about what 
lies ahead for U.S-Latin American 
relations. Prognostications and 
recommendations can of course 
be made, but the variability of 
Trump’s actions and the develop-
ments in domestic Latin Ameri-
can governments mean that their 
accuracy cannot be ensured. An 
example of this unpredictability 
can be seen in the recent secret, 
off-the-books meeting between 
Trump and two former presidents 
of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe and An-
drés Pastrana. Between the 15th 
and 16th of April 2017 at the Mar-
a-Lago Resort, Trump engaged in 
conversations with Pastrana and 
Uribe about “the region’s prob-
lems and Colombia’s perspectives 
on those problems”; it was a con-
versation which Pastrana him-
self termed as “cordial and very 
frank” (Ordoñez/Kumar 2017). 
For former presidents to cam-
paign against the sitting Presi-
dent’s peace accord is problem-
atic in and of itself, but this situ-
ation is even more troublesome 
when the entreaties are directed 
to a president deciding whether 
or not to approve a US $450 mil-
In the end, how-
ever, Trump’s 
presidency will 
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lion package of aid to implement 
said peace accords (Ordoñez/
Kumar 2017). Without Trump’s 
stamp of approval on the peace 
agreement – an agreement Uribe 
and Pastrana have fought hard to 
halt – Colombia’s future is thrown 
into jeopardy. The future of Vene-
zuela is similarly in question. 
The Trump administration has 
implemented few policies of sub-
stance with relation to the Ma-
duro regime despite speaking out 
against it with fervor. An opportu-
nity for real multilateral coopera-
tion may be brewing as neighbor-
ing states step up their rhetoric 
and international organizations 
like the OAS take heed (LaFran-
chi 2017). Such a multilateral ef-
fort would be advantageous to 
the United State because it would 
grant legitimacy to an agreement 
that would otherwise be seen as 
a unilateral expression of “yan-
qui” interference. Such a move 
would not be unthinkable under 
Trump, especially seeing as both 
Tillerson and Haley have called 
out human rights abuses and 
authoritarianism under Ma duro. 
So, while there is cause for some 
pessimism when analyzing the 
future of North-South relations, 
it is crucial to remember that 
Latin America has the tools nec-
essary to temper such a cooling. 
Additionally, enough opportunity 
windows exist between U.S. and 
Latin American security interests 
to encourage intercontinental co-
operation on issues like human 
rights and globalization. What re-
mains to be seen is whether or 
not Latin America will take ad-
vantage of the frameworks at 
their disposal in order to compel 
the United States to listen to a 
region that has been systemati-
cally neglected by dozens of past 
U.S. presidents – Republican and 
Democrat alike. 
The Trump ad-
ministration has 
implemented 
few policies of 
substance with 
relation to the 
Ma duro regime 
despite speak-
ing out against 
it with fervor. 
An opportunity 
for real multilat-
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